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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the MSc in International Accounting, Auditing 
and Financial Management at the International Hellenic University.  
In this study, I consider critically the effects of ownership on tax aggressiveness. 
I analyze the importance of tax avoidance and the weight that public opinion gives in 
these days and we focus our survey on Greek listed companies during the period of 
crisis (2010-2014). Ι summarize the literature on tax aggressiveness focusing in the 
measurement, the decisive factors and the results of tax avoidance. Then Ι investigate 
the role of ownership structure in tax avoidance. Ι divide ownership structure into fam-
ily business, government ownership and foreign ownership and we investigate each 
one separately. For our research Ι use two samples of 165 and 121 listed companies 
from the Athens Stock Exchange. Ι used two samples because we wanted to have a 
wider look at all of the ASE categories and a narrow one on the Main Market. The re-
sults point out there is no statistical relation between ownership structures above and 
tax aggressiveness. 
At this point I would like to thank Dr. Stergios Leventis, as my supervisor, and 
Dr. Alexandros Sikalidis, as my mentor, for their guidance in the realization of this dis-
sertation. Also, my family, colleagues and friends (especially Egor Gios) for their help 
and support during the master period.  
Keywords: (Tax aggressiveness, ownership structure, Greek listed firms, crisis 
period, corporate governance)  
 
 
Mylonas Konstantinos 
31/10/2016 
 
  
 
  -i- 
Preface 
............................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................ 
 
  -iii- 
Contents 
 
Περιεχόμενα 
ABSTRACT ...............................................................................................................IV 
PREFACE ................................................................................................................... I 
1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 1 
1.1. WHY GREECE ......................................................................................................... 2 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW ........................................................................................... 7 
2.1 .TAX AGGRESSIVENESS ................................................................................................ 7 
2.1.1. DECISIVE FACTORS OF TAX AVOIDANCE ........................................................................ 7 
2.1.2. THE EFFECTS OF TAX AVOIDANCE ............................................................................... 8 
2.2.CORPORATE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT................................ 10 
2.2.1.FAMILY OWNERSHIP............................................................................................... 10 
2.2.2.GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP .................................................................................... 11 
2.2.3.FOREIGN OWNERSHIP ............................................................................................ 12 
2.3.THE ROLE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ....................................................................... 13 
3. METHODOLOGY RESEARCH-RESEARCH DESIGN ................................................. 15 
3.1.SAMPLES ................................................................................................................ 15 
3.2.DEPENDENT VARIABLE .............................................................................................. 16 
3.3.INDEPENDENT VARIABLES .......................................................................................... 16 
3.4.CONTROL VARIABLES ................................................................................................ 17 
3.5.MODEL SPECIFICATION .............................................................................................. 18 
4. DATA ANALYSIS ................................................................................................ 19 
  -iv- 
4.1.SAMPLE A .............................................................................................................. 19 
4.2.SAMPLE B ............................................................................................................... 22 
5. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 24 
6. BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................. 26 
APPENDIX ................................................................................................................ 1 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  -1- 
1. Introduction 
In this dissertation, I study whether the ownership structure and governance in-
fluence the tax avoidance. It is common practice for many corporations to try to bene-
fit from the opportunities that the global tax environment provides. International cor-
porations have many tactics to avoid taxes such as locating operations in tax heavens, 
moving profits from countries with high corporate tax to countries with low corporate 
tax, take advantage of variations between the tax specifications of several countries, 
and taking advantage of tax agreements with the governments in the host countries. In 
the last years, tax avoidance has become a topic which drew considerable attention 
not only by academics purposes but also by the general public and the government 
regulators. New cases that include well known corporations and deal with fraud and 
tax evasion, have created fundamental transformations in the corporate environment 
by changing rules that had to do with corporate governance, accounting and taxation, 
and in process lead to an universal debate regarding changes in the international taxa-
tion (Crocker and Slemrod, 2005). An example of the above is the Sarbanes–Oxley Act 
that was passed on the 31st of July in 2002 after the Enron scandal. The public opinion 
is becoming more interested in tax avoidance over the years, especially with the dis-
closures of certain tax avoiding companies, which are well known to the public (Star-
bucks, Google, Apple). Because companies are interested in the public opinion, and 
therefore their reputation, they are not avoiding these taxes in obvious ways. Howev-
er, a lot of companies still avoid taxes. On the contrary, business leaders, like Warren 
Buffett, are publicly admitting the necessity of participating in the collective effort 
(Miller, 2010). 
One of the difficult tasks is that there is not one definition that is worldwide 
used and explains terms like tax avoidance or aggressiveness with a generally accepted 
way (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). Since tax avoidance has a central place in the public 
debate, it will add to the understanding of the effect and therefore contributes to this 
public discussion. It also gives insight to both the government and auditors into how 
corporate ownership structures affect tax avoidance, and therefore what kind of com-
panies are likely to use it. Corporate tax aggressiveness is an issue that concerns public 
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administration since it effects the legality of the tax burden spread in addition to the 
cost that emerges from the raise of the taxes (Slemrod, 2004). 
 
1.1. Why Greece 
 
Countries, like Greece for example, depend their macroeconomics and budget-
ary objectives in the reduction of tax avoidance. We will focus our survey to Greece for 
two reasons.  
First, the consequences of the 2009 global crisis. From 2009, Greece was smit-
ten by the global financial crisis with dramatic results in economy. The Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), which is a measure for the health and the size of an economy, had a 
vertical drop. From 2008 until 2015 there is a decrease in GDP of $159, 25 billion. This 
slippage in GDP had enormous consequences to employment. Unemployment rate 
was 7, 9% in 2008 and reached 27, 5% in 2013. It is undoubtedly a deep and longtime 
recession period. In table 1, we can have clear view of GDP and unemployment rate us 
discussed above.  
  
Table 1. GDP and Unemployment rate    
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
GDP 354,46 330 299,38 287,78 245,67 239,51 235,57 195,21 
Unemployment 7,9% 10,3% 12,7% 17,9% 24,4% 27,5% 26,5% 24,2% 
 
Notes: GDP is measured as the total dollar value of all goods and services produced in one year. The evidence 
are from the World Bank and the prices are in $ billions. Unemployment is measured as a percent of the total 
workforce of Greece. The evidence are from the Greek Statistical Authority. 
 
According to Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (2007), the Greek economy has cur-
rently become more liberal and the financial system is less market-based than the E.E. 
average. Even though the adverse circumstances, for 2015, Greece is the 15th largest 
economy in the 28-member European Union. The GDP value of Greece was $ 195.21 
  -3- 
billion and represents 0.31 percent of the world economy. Otherwise, Greece is the 
46th largest economy in the world (World Bank, OECD, 2016).  
Second, the structure and function of the Greek tax system in accordance with 
the level of corporate tax rate. Many international institutions Like International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF) have detected tax avoidance in Greece. Especially, IMF (Greece, 
2013) reports that the annual unreported income is more than €28 billion. Moreover, 
they detect Lower effective tax rates than the European Union average, which sug-
gests evidence for tax avoidance or tax evasion. Desai (2007) believes that the quantity 
of a county’s diversion and firm’s valuation are effected by the characteristics of the 
corporate tax system of each country. Bronchi C. (2001), characterizes the Greek tax 
system as a complex and non-transparent system, with a lack of strong tax enforce-
ment. It is also notorious for the corruption of state tax collectors and the complexity 
of Greek tax law. Prasopoulou E. (2011) inform us that the computerization of tax au-
thorities in advanced countries has been completed since the late 1970s. Greece was 
late at successfully introducing Information and Communications Technology (ICT) in 
the operations of the Ministry of Finance. Citizens began to have access in the taxation 
information system (TAXIS) only in 2000. In the last years, Greece has made a system-
atic effort to redesign the whole tax system. In 2012, the Greek government estab-
lished the General Secretariat of Public Revenues (GSPR). The purpose of GSPR is the 
delineation, affirmation and collection of public revenues (law 4093/2012). From 
1/1/2017, GSPR will be an Independent Regulatory Agency (law 4389/2016). This is an 
effort that creditors believe will reduce political interference in tax administration. 
There is a huge debate about the stability and the competitiveness of corporate tax in 
Greece. Contrary to other tax system, taxes in Greece change constantly. On the one 
hand, people believe that the corporate should be high, in order to sustain a high living 
standard and be able to pay the nations debts without cutting budget from welfare 
and social benefits. On the other hand, the corporate tax should be low, in order to be 
competitive with the bordering countries and attract investments from the private sec-
tor.  In table 2 below as we can notice the modifications regarding corporate tax in the 
largest economies worldwide and Greece during the period 2009-2014. 
 
  -4- 
 
 
 
Table 2. Corporate tax (%) in the largest economies and Greece 
 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
USA 40 40 40 40 40 40 
China 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Japan 40,69 40,69 40,69 38,01 38,01 35,64 
Germany 29,44 29,41 29,37 29,48 29,55 29,58 
UK 28 28 26 24 23 21 
France 33,33 33,33 33,33 33,33 33,33 33,33 
India 33,99 33,99 32,44 32,45 33,99 33,99 
Italy 31,4 31,4 31,4 31,4 31,4 31,4 
Brazil 34 34 34 34 34 34 
Greece 25 24 20 20 26 26 
 
Notes: These are the largest economies according their GDP. The evidence is from the 
World Bank and United Nations. The evidence for the corporate tax rates are from 
KPMG and are expressed as percentages. 
 
 
Table 3. Corporate tax (%) in Greece and bordering countries 
 
 
 
 
Note:  The evidence for the corporate tax rates are from KPMG and are expressed 
as percentages. 
 
It is noticeable from the tables above that Greece has a competitive corporate 
tax rate when it comes to large economies, but faces strong antagonistic rates from 
 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Albania 10 10 10 10 10 15 
FYROM 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Bulgaria 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Cyprus 10 10 10 10 12,5 12,5 
Turkey 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Greece 25 24 20 20 26 26 
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the bordering countries. Moreover, the corporate tax changes constantly. Specifically 
for our scrutiny period, in 2010 under the new law (3842/2010) the corporate tax was 
24% and 20% for 2011 and 2012. In 2013 a new tax law (4172/2013) set the corporate 
tax law at 26%. This instability creates unique characteristics that makes research chal-
lenging. 
So far studies, regarding Greece, have not focus on the connection between 
ownership structures and the phenomenon of not paying or avoiding taxes. I believe it 
is worth the time to research the effects of ownership on the above situation in order 
to a deep understanding of the business environment. The nature of corporate owner-
ship, which is highly concentrated in Greece, gives me a unique opportunity for re-
search. 
I conduct our research on a sample of 165 and 121 Greek listed firms for the 
period 2010-2014. My results indicates that the consequences of ownership structure 
on tax aggressiveness in Greek listed firms during the period 2010-2014, are statistical-
ly insignificant. All data are collected from original sources and the literature is ade-
quate. I believe my attempt to study the effects of ownership structure on tax avoid-
ance for Greek listed is well-timed. 
The following dissertation is structured as: part 2 has the literature review and 
therefore analyses the definition, the measurement, the determinants and the conse-
quences of tax avoidance; ownership structure and corporate governance. Part 3 
shows the empirical method of the research and explains the sample source of data; 
dependent and independent variables measurements; and the suggested estimation 
method. Part 4 provides data analysis and discussion. Part 5 presents the conclusion 
and the recommendations of the dissertation. 
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2. Literature Review 
In this part, I summarize the published work on tax aggressiveness. Then I ex-
amine the importance of ownership structure and corporate governance in tax avoid-
ance.  
2.1 .Tax Aggressiveness  
In literature it is easy to find many terms that try to portray with words differ-
ent tax behavior. Some of these terms are tax aggressiveness, tax avoidance, tax eva-
sion, etc. For this dissertation, I will focus on tax avoidance and the legitimate ways 
that tax payers use in order to avoid taxes. The illegal ways are difficult to be detected 
and there are not going to be a subject of study here. Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) de-
fine tax avoidance as the reduction of explicit taxes. Dyreng et al. 2008 believe that tax 
avoidance reveals all the dealing that have an impact on the company’s explicit tax ob-
ligations. Moreover, they introduce a wider definition of tax avoidance as anything 
that decreases the company’s effective tax rate for a considerable period of time. Ac-
cording to Chen et al (2010), corporations so as to determine the level of avoidance in 
taxes, put at risk the profits over the costs in order to manipulate taxes compromise 
the benefits against the expenses of managing taxes. The profits include larger savings 
from taxes, while in contrast the expenses contains the possible punishment from the 
tax authorities, Finally, they support taxes correspond to a significant expense for the 
firm and a lowering in the cash obtainable to management and stockholders, lead their 
incentives to reduce taxes through tax avoidance policies. Rego (2003) suggests that 
corporations which repeatedly report low payments in taxes have higher cash flows. 
There is a shortage of revealing in the financial statements regarding income for taxa-
tion and the precise amount paid or deferred to be paid in the annual profits (Hanlon 
M., Heitzman S.2010).  
2.1.1. Decisive factors of tax avoidance 
Many studies investigate the connection between firm characteristics and tax 
avoidance. Gupta and Newberry (1997) suggests that the effective tax rates are con-
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nected with the entity’s capital structure and assets. Stickney and McGee (1982) sup-
port that size and foreign operations are less important determinants than capital in-
tensity, debt, and financing activities that generate changes in the effective tax rates. 
Rego (2003) argues that economies of scale exist for tax avoidance, which means that 
a larger firm should have higher effective tax rates than a smaller one and companies 
with higher profits would have lower effective tax rates from companies lower profits. 
Newest literature incorporates agency predictions into an analysis of corporate tax 
avoidance. One aspect is that if tax avoidance methods create value and compensation 
incentives line up the manager’s interest with shareholders, then corporations that use 
these incentives should involve in more tax avoidance. Slemrod (2004) suggests that 
the incentives of the managers to involve tax evasion are influenced by the relation-
ship between the shareholders of a company and the manager responsible for the tax-
es of the company and the way the managers contract will alter as a response to the 
policies forced by the tax authorities. Desai and Dharmapala (2006) present a negative 
relationship between managers’ incentive compensation and tax avoidance measures. 
They proved that higher incentives are related to lower levels of tax sheltering, in a 
way that positive feedback effects between sheltering and diversion. One more im-
portant aspect that effects the avoidance of taxes is ownership structure. Desai and 
Dharmapala (2006) suggests that ownership structure can alter as an answer to prob-
lems that have to do with wider governance issues. Also, the nature of ownership 
structure can have consequences on the operations that deal with the tax issues. A 
typical instance is transfer pricing issues. Transfer pricing is a technical skill that allo-
cates with the best possible way expenses and income within a group of related enti-
ties. This technique handles activities within a group of companies that are based in 
different countries and their main purpose is to enforce corporate tax policies in each 
country. Cross-border activities may be influenced by independent institutions and 
then have consequences in the applied tax policy.  
2.1.2. The effects of tax avoidance 
The potential consequences of tax avoidance can be numerous. The most obvi-
ous gains of avoiding paying taxes is the money entities save. The money savings can 
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generate high cash flows for the firm and this can lead to a series of investments that 
will finally end up a raise of the firm’s value. These savings are a bonus for sharehold-
ers, but also managers can benefit from it since they are rewarded though bonuses 
that are connected with the tax management of the firm. One more gain from tax ag-
gressiveness for the decision makers is rent seeking. Rent seeking deals with maximiz-
ing activities decision makers try to attain at the cost of stockholders. Desai and Dhar-
mapala (2004, 2006) show the connection between rent-seeking and tax avoidance. 
The can be revealed by tax authorities and forced to pay further taxes, interest and 
penalties. Crocker and Slemrod (2005) support that the effect of tax avoidance de-
pends on whether the corporation or the management is punished and the extent to 
which the corporation can counterbalance any penalty with the salary of the tax of-
ficer.  
Tax avoidance also has potential consequences for shareholders and managers. 
Tax avoidance could be carried out for the advantage of the stockholder benefit of the 
shareholders because it create higher cash flows and since it rises cash flows and as a 
consequence it can rise the value of the firm (Kourdoumpalou, 2015). In addition, if the 
corporation evades taxes by investing in R & D, then implicit taxes could have a nega-
tive effect on shareholders’ wealth (Berger, 1993). If stockholders request from the 
decision makers to have higher cash flows, then the avoidance of taxes is a result of 
the managers choice if the managers haw the appropriate motive. If managers use the 
best possible way to avoid taxes and investors have a fair opinion about the extent and 
advantage from tax avoidance, then the conclusion is that no relation is about to come 
up between tax avoidance and firm value (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). Another cost 
is the possible discount in the price that is imposed by other stockholders if they reveal 
that decision makers use the avoidance of taxes to distract rents (Desai and Dhar-
mapala 2006). The reputational risks of tax avoidance have dual effects on the firm’s 
existence. Christensen and Murphy (2004), support that tax avoidance doubts the 
rightfulness of the corporation in the society. A legitimate corporation is expected by 
the public to be corporate responsible in ways that allow the firm to contribute to the 
welfare of the society where it operates. 
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2.2.Corporate ownership structure and hypothesis development 
Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) observe that deciding factors of tax aggressive-
ness like ownership structure and others are crucial but they have not been studied in 
an appropriate level. The three general ownership structures which will be determined 
are family ownership, government ownership and foreign ownership.  
  
2.2.1.Family ownership 
Even after the agency theory (Berle and Means, 1932), corporations outside the 
Anglo-Saxon countries are continuing to concentrate ownership and control in the 
hands of families. Chen et al, (2010) acknowledge that the way family businesses are 
designed creates different and unique characteristics such as the agency conflict in re-
lation with the profits and expenses from tax avoidance. Moreover, they suggest that 
with the existence of the family that established the company as a blockholder entails 
a large conflict of interest between minority and majority stockholders and a smaller 
one between owners and decision makers in contrast with firms that there is not a 
founding family. The characteristics and range of agency conflicts can affect the level 
of tax aggressiveness. In Peng and Jiang (2010) model for Asia, countries with ad-
vanced institutions, having a family CEO or pyramid structure may provide a better in-
ternal control mechanism and better access to resources, thus the benefits of family 
control may outweigh the costs. On the other hand, countries with less advanced insti-
tutions, more control through family CEO or pyramid structure may appear more op-
portunities for controlling families to repossess power from minority shareholders. 
Joos, Leone, and Zimmerman (2003) describe that the normal time that aCEO stays in 
his position is 8 years for non-family firms and 17 years when CEO title passes from 
one family member to another. 
 Several literature mention that family business face a reputation issue. Isakov 
and Weisskopf (2015), believe the decision making of a family firm will be influenced 
by the reputation they have as a benefit and want to maintain. Casson (1999) supports 
that family owners have strong incentive to protect their family name, because from 
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their point of view, firms are to be handed down to their descendants rather than a 
fortune to waste on theirs lifetime. These strong connections and feelings are making 
families more preoccupied with their reputation risk from being part of a tax evasion 
scandal and facing lawsuits form the tax authorities. Chen et al. (2010) agree with De-
sai and Dharmapala (2006) that companies which are controlled by families evade less 
taxes than non-family businesses. La Porta et al. (1999), provide evidence that 65% of 
Greek listed companies are family owned businesses, 30% is government owned and 
5% are companies without a blockholder. 
Hypothesis 1: Firms with family ownership are less likely to participate in tax 
avoidance practices than non-family ownership firms. 
 
2.2.2.Government Ownership 
Government ownership is present when the government is the majority share-
holder of a company, and therefore dictates board structures and certain policies. An-
nuar et al (2014) reports that the sources in academic papers which examines the rela-
tionship between government ownership and tax avoidance are limited for the devel-
oped economies. A given reason could be the lack of this kind of ownership in these 
economies. The explanation might be the absence of such form of ownership in those 
economies. Uddin (2015) suspects that the United Arab Emirates might have the high-
er government ownership with 48% in all public firms worldwide. He also declares that 
the government, by being the ultimate political force in a country, behaves like an 
owner of a firm and specify crucial decisions, which determines the performance of 
that firm in the global business environment. The majority of the literature comes for 
the case of China, since it is one of the few countries that still has a large number of 
Public Listed Companies. Liu et al (2014), support that when the corporations are gov-
ernment-owned the goal is to support the government and achieve its social purposes. 
They also suggest that the state dominance and its goals can cause a conflict of inter-
est between the state as a controlling shareholder and the minority shareholders. 
Someone would expect that, as voting rights increase, so would interference. Tian and 
Estrin (2007) argue that there is a shareholding threshold in Chinese companies after 
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which the political interference could stop increasing. Richardson et al. (2016) finds for 
China’s PLC’s a non-linear association between state ownership concentration and tax 
avoidance that displays an inverted U-shaped pattern. Companies who are controlled 
by the state are notorious for maladministration, poor quality of services and financial 
performance (Vickers and Yarrow, 1991). Shleifer A. (1998) believes that government 
ownership is likely to be better to private ownership when reputational mechanisms 
are weak. Companies controlled by the government are inefficient because political 
parties use the management of this companies to satisfy and prize their followers. 
(Boycko et al. 1996). 
Hypothesis 2: Companies with government ownership are less possible to par-
ticipate in tax avoidance practices than non-government ownership firms. 
 
2.2.3.Foreign Ownership 
Foreign ownership occurs when multinational corporations or institutional in-
vestors, inject long-term investments in a foreign country. Institutional investors are 
large investors such as insurance firms, banks, pension funds and other nominee firms. 
The presence of foreign ownership may lead firms to change their tax avoidance poli-
cy. Bird and Karolyi (2014) proved that corporations owned by institutional investors 
and had just-added to the Russell 2000 index are deteriorating ETR and increase the 
use of tax haven subsidiaries. Huizinga and Nicodeme (2006) notice that foreign own-
ership is higher in small countries and support there is a positive relation between for-
eign ownership and firm tax burdens at the country level. Additionally, they believe 
that the efficacy of foreign ownership on taxation could be used to decrease distor-
tions in the international tax system created by international inequalities in corporate 
tax burdens. Dahlquist and Robertsson, (2001) find that foreign investors prefer firms 
with large cash and firms that pay low dividends. Moreover, they agree with Kang and 
Stulz (1997) that foreign investors prefer large firms. According to Huizinga and Nielsen 
(1997), foreign firm ownership attend to rise corporate taxes. Fuest and Hemmelgarn 
(2005) disagree and suggest that foreign firm ownership tends to decrease corporate 
taxes and does not inevitably act as a break on tax rate reductions. Egger et al. (2007) 
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suggest there is a positive savings effect which is positive in high-tax host countries 
when it comes to foreign plant ownership. 
Hypothesis 3: Firms with foreign ownership are more probable to participate in 
tax avoidance practices than non-foreign ownership firms. 
 
2.3.The role of Corporate Governance 
According to classical finance studies, “corporate governance deals with the 
ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a re-
turn on their investment” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, page 737). The need for corpo-
rate governance arises due to the separation of management and ownership. The 
agency theory, as posed by Berle and Means (1932), recognizes the conflict of interests 
between the owners and the agents. Chan et al, (2013) believe that corporate govern-
ance is one of the key factors in understanding, explaining and evaluate different cor-
porate ownership structures. Kourdoumpalou (2015) suggests that the relation be-
tween the amount of stocks kept by shareholders and board members with tax avoid-
ance is negative. Corporate governance helps us understand the reaction of firms to 
modifications in the level of corporate tax. When governance is not strong, arise in in 
the level of tax rates will lead to even lower revenues from corporate tax and vice ver-
sa. (Desai et al. 2007). From the research of Boussaidi and Hamed (2015) turns out the 
variety in the members of the board and the low level of involvement of the ownership 
in the management reduces tax avoidance, in opposition with concentrated ownership 
which seems to reinforce tax avoidance. Desai and Dharmapala (2006) support that 
the negative effect of higher powered incentives on tax avoidance activity is observed 
in firms with weak governance. This effect does not seems to apply to firms with 
strong governance.  
In Greece the first corporate governance code was established in 1999, follow-
ing the crash of the exchange stock market. This code was an effort made by the Greek 
authorities to reintroduce trust in investors and public opinion after the 1999 crash 
(Committee on Corporate Governance, 1999). Three years later, methods regarding 
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corporate governance became compulsory for the public firms with the Law 
3016/2002. Greek companies show a decent degree of compliance with OECD CG prin-
ciple. The compliance of Greek companies with the OECD Corporate Governance prin-
ciples is quite satisfying (Xanthakis M. et al, 2004). 
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3. Methodology Research-Research Design 
In this part, I demonstrate the research method for this dissertation. It con-
cludes the samples, the variables, definitions and explanations why they were chosen.  
3.1.Samples 
The samples used in this dissertation consists of public companies listed in the 
Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) during the period 2010-2014. The ASE began trading in 
1876 and it is the only stock exchange market in Greece (helex.gr). The ASE is a small 
stock exchange and has a low number of listed firms compared with the European Un-
ion average (Dasilas and Leventis, 2010). The financial crisis influenced the number of 
public companies in the ASE. In 2004 the ASE had 350 firms approximately. On October 
2016 the ASE had 220 companies in the Security Market which are represented with 
230 stocks. There are also 14 companies in the Alternative Market. The stocks of the 
Securities Market are divided into five categories: Main Market, Low Dispersion, Sur-
veillance, Under Suspension and Under Deletion (helex.gr).  
For our research we will use two samples. Sample A will have companies from 
all five categories and we will focus on 165 listed companies. Sample B will have com-
panies only from the Main Market of ASE and will focus on 121 listed companies. I 
used two samples because I want to have a wider look at all of the ASE categories and 
a narrow one on the Main Market.  In both samples we exclude companies from the 
Alternative Market and from the banking, insurance and brokerage sector, since their 
unique characteristics will not make them compatible for comparison and due to data 
unavailability. Data regarding the voting rights are available from the Athens Stock Ex-
change website and the corporations’ websites. The Athens Stock Exchange provides 
information only for ownership that exceeds five percent. This would be our bench-
mark for our research. Data regarding the control variables of total assets, ROA, cur-
rent ratio and age are from Amadeus database. Data regarding capital intensity, lever-
age and growth opportunities are from the Bloomberg database. In case of missing da-
ta we searched companies’ websites and filled in whenever this was possible. The se-
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lection of Greek listed firms is made because, only a small amount of research has 
been conducted on this interaction, and it will give insight in the connection among 
corporate ownership and tax avoidance, in Greece. 
3.2.Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is depict by corporate tax aggressiveness. There is a 
plethora of measures of corporate tax avoidance used in bibliography, such as the ef-
fective tax rate, book tax differences, discretionary measures, unrecognized tax bene-
fits etc. For the purpose of this dissertation, I use the Effective Tax Rate (ETR) as a 
measurement of tax aggressiveness. The effective tax rate is the average rate at which 
a company is taxed and shows the average rate at which its pre-tax profits are taxed. 
According to IAS 12, Income Tax, it is calculated by dividing total tax expenses to the 
firm's pre-tax income.  
 
 
 
Understanding what the numerator captures is essential. The numerator in the 
ETR is total income tax expense which is a sum of current tax and deferred tax. A tax 
strategy that defers taxes will not change the ETR. An even more important factor is 
the denominator of the ratio. Therefore, if two corporations have the same denomina-
tor but they are paying different taxes, this means that the corporation which pays less 
taxes will be considered more effective in tax avoidance. Chen et al (2010), suggests 
that ETR reflects aggressive tax planning through permanent book-tax differences and 
that firms which are more tax aggressive have lower ETR than other firms.  
3.3.Independent Variables 
It is believed that certain ownership structures have an effect on tax avoidance. 
Specifically, I examine family ownership structure (Family) and it is calculated as the 
percent of stocks owned by the founding family to the total shares of the company. 
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According to Bauweraerts (2013), in order characterize a business, family business it 
needs to meet certain criteria. For our study this criteria will be: the percent owned by 
a family must be at least 5% and presence in the management of the firm. Government 
ownership structure (Government) is also calculated as the percent of shares owned 
by the government to the total shares of the company. Foreign ownership structure 
(Foreign) and measured as the proportion of companies’ shares held by foreign inves-
tors to the total shareholding of the companies. The larger the voting rights are, the 
greater the largest owner’s incentives to extract private benefits from the firm. 
3.4.Control Variables 
Previous studies have shown that control variables like the size of the company, 
profits, debt, capital intensity, growth opportunities, age and liquidity can influence 
the company’s tax burden. These are denoted each in order as fsize, profit, lev, capint, 
growth, age and liquidity. Fsize is calculated as the natural logarithm of company’s to-
tal assets. Rego (2003) suggests that larger firms are more complex in nature and are 
able to achieve economies of scale in tax avoidance to decrease their tax burden. Prof-
it as return on assets (ROA), measured as pre-tax income scaled by total assets (Gupta 
and Newberry, 1997). Tian and Estrin (2008) suggest that ROA is a better measurement 
of profitability than return on sales, since the seasonal effects of sales can be signifi-
cant. Lev is measured as total debt to total asset. Stickney and McGee (1982) support 
that Lev is positively associated with tax avoidance. Capint is measured as property, 
plants and machinery to total assets. Growth opportunities (MKTBK) is measured by 
the Market-to-book ratio, which is calculated as the relative rate between the equity 
market value of the company to the equity book value (Gupta and Newberry, 1997). 
Age is a variable for the age of the company which is computed as the natural loga-
rithm of the number of years since its creation for each company i at time t (Villalonga 
and Amit, 2006). For the purpose of our research, we calculate the age of the company 
from the point that the legal entity was established. Liquidity is computed as the rela-
tive rate of current assets to short terms debts. All data for the above ratios and natu-
ral logarithms are from Amadeus and Bloomberg databases. All numbers and results 
are in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Finally, Year 
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dummy variables are included to control for possible differences in corporate tax 
avoidance activities in Greece over the 2010–2014 financial years. The Year dummies 
are 1 if the year falls within a specific year, otherwise 0. No sign predictions are made 
for the control variables.  
3.5.Model Specification 
To examine the association between the ownership structure and tax aggres-
siveness, we used a regression model following the models of Chen et al (2010) and 
Annuar et al (2014) in order to perform an analysis regarding various parameters in-
cluded in our model. We estimate the following regression model: 
TaxAgg i t = αi + β1Family i,t + β2Government i,t + β3Foreign i,t + β4FSize i,t + 
β5Profitability i,t+ β6Lev i,t + β7Capint i,t + β8Growth i,t + β9Liquidity i,t + β10Age i,t + year 
dummies + ε i,t 
The subscripts i and t denote firms and year respectively. α is the constant 
term, β1 to β10 are slopes and ε is the disturbance term of the model. TaxAgg measure 
as discussed above.  
 
For the appropriate presentation of our data we will use panel data. Panel data 
are using both time series and cross-sectional elements. In this way will include infor-
mation across both time and space. This is important because the panel keeps the 
same entities and measures some amount about them over time. Brooks (2014) in-
form us about several advantages that panel data provide us. First, it is easier to ana-
lyze a wider range of issues and be able to deal with more complex problems rather 
than would be possible with time series or cross-sectional alone. Second, if we need to 
examine how variables, or the relationships between them, change over time, using 
either series data or cross sectional data we would face problems. By using pure time 
series data we would often require a long run of data nothing more than to get an ad-
equate number of observations to be able to conduct a significant hypothesis tests. 
With the combination of cross-sectional and time series data, we can increase the 
number of degrees of freedom, and therefore the force of the test, by using infor-
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mation on the behavior of a large number of entities at the same time. The extra varia-
tion presented by combining the data in this way can also help to lessen harm from the 
problems of multicollinearity that may occurs if time series are modelled individually.  
Third, by designing the model in a suitable way, we can eliminate the impact of certain 
forms of omitted variables bias in regression results. From the above it is rational to 
decide to use panel data for 165 and 121 entities during a five year period. The meth-
od we will use for the panel analysis is the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method.  The 
method of OLS requires taking each vertical distance from the point to the line of our 
regression, squaring it and then minimizing the total sum of the areas of squares 
(therefore ‘least squares’). 
 
4. Data Analysis 
4.1.Sample A 
First we will analyze our results for sample A, which has 165 companies from all 
the categories of ASE. Table 4 provides descriptive statistics.  
 
[See Table 4] 
 
TAXAGG ranges between -38.02 and 43.06 with a 0.1078 mean and a 2.968 
standard deviation. With the ETR average at 10.78% this means that the average is 
smaller in contrast with the average corporate tax rate (24.44 %) during the scrutiny 
period. As a consequence, in average Greek listed companies pay less than the average 
rate. In addition, we notice from our sample that same companies have ETR=0. This 
means that either this companies have experienced managers and consultants who are 
available to provide know-how in tax avoidance or that these companies tax evade. 
FAMILY ranges between 0 and 0.97 with a 0.44 mean and a standard deviation of 0.28. 
The average here is 44% and compared with the other ownership structures that we 
  -20- 
examine, FAMILY is the dominant one. GOVERNMENT ranges between 0 and 0.97 with 
a 0.04 mean and a standard deviation of 0.16.FOREIGN ranges between 0 and 0.97 
with a 0.09 mean and a standard deviation of 0.2. SIZE ranges between 11.79 and 29.1 
with a 394300.7 mean and a standard deviation of 10703883. PROFIT ranges between -
67.48 and 54.35 with a -1.92 mean and a standard deviation of 7.92. LEV ranges be-
tween 0 and 84.32 with a 32.79 mean and a standard deviation of 19.66. CAPINT rang-
es between 0.0006 and 0.94 with a 0.38 mean and a standard deviation of 0.23. 
GROWTH ranges between 0.04 and 26.75 with a 0.9 mean and a standard deviation of 
1.58. LIQUIDITY ranges between -2655000 and 645000 with a -3650.799 mean and a 
standard deviation of 104605. AGE ranges between 2.3 and 4.84 with a 3.5 mean and a 
standard deviation of 0.53. 
 
[See Table 5] 
 
Table 5 shows the correlations between variables in the TAXAGG model. The 
correlation is according to Spearman’s correlation coefficient. A closer look in table 6 
shows a negative connection between FAMILY and TAXAGG. This indicates that firms 
with family ownership are more tax aggressive. There is a positive relation between 
GOVERNMENT and FOREIGN with TAXAGG. This indicates that firms with government 
ownership and foreign ownership are less tax aggressive. TAXAGG is also positive asso-
ciated with SIZE, PROFIT, GROWTH and LIQUIDITY. There is a negative association be-
tween TAXAGG and LEV, CAPINT and AGE. 
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Table 6. Regression results 
Dependent Variable: TAXAGG   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.200531 0.823565 0.243491 0.8077 
FAMILY 0.006478 0.589755 0.010985 0.9912 
GOVERNMENT 0.365262 0.829500 0.440340 0.6598 
FOREIGN 1.130692 0.754024 1.499544 0.1342 
SIZE -1.21E-09 1.04E-08 -0.116280 0.9075 
PROFIT 0.017195 0.015253 1.127285 0.2600 
LEV 0.015416 0.006191 2.490283 0.0130 
CAPINT 0.025121 0.511058 0.049155 0.9608 
GROWTH -0.007807 0.070385 -0.110921 0.9117 
LIQUIDITY -3.28E-07 1.05E-06 -0.311857 0.7552 
AGE -0.215943 0.217465 -0.993002 0.3210 
D2010 0.090059 0.348792 0.258203 0.7963 
D2011 -0.049666 0.350599 -0.141661 0.8874 
D2012 -0.241187 0.355921 -0.677640 0.4982 
D2013 0.548172 0.356316 1.538443 0.1244 
     
     R-squared 0.024423    Mean dependent var 0.107842 
Adjusted R-squared 0.005506    S.D. dependent var 2.968105 
S.E. of regression 2.959923    Akaike info criterion 5.028346 
Sum squared resid 6325.545    Schwarz criterion 5.122022 
Log likelihood -1837.946    Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.064471 
F-statistic 1.291042    Durbin-Watson stat 1.988332 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.206789    
     
     
 
Table 6 point out the results from the regression model of tax aggressiveness 
with independent and control variables. 
As we can notice from the table above variable FAMILY has coefficient 
0.006478 and probability of 0.9912. GOVERNMENT has coefficient 0.365262 and prob-
ability of 0.6598. FOREIGN has coefficient 1.130692 and probability of 0.1342. From 
the control variables, only LEV has a challenging probability of 0.013. This means that if 
the significant level was at 25%, the variance LEN would be statistically significant. The 
Durbin Watson statistic is 1.988332 and since it is near 2 this means there is no auto-
correlation in the sample. R-square is 0.0224423, a number very close to zero and this 
means that the dependent variable TAXAGG cannot be predicted from the independ-
ent variables FAMILY, GOVERNMENT and FOREIGN. 
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4.2.Sample B 
Now, we will analyze our results for sample B. Sample B has 121 companies on-
ly from the Main Market of ASE. Table 7 provides descriptive statistics. 
 
[See Table 7] 
 
TAXAGG ranges between -38.02 and 43.06 with a 0.075 mean and a 3.28 stand-
ard deviation. With the ETR average at 7.5 %, the average is smaller than the average 
corporate tax rate (24.44 %) during the scrutiny period.  It is noticeable that the aver-
age ETR from sample B is smaller than the average ETR from sample A. FAMILY ranges 
between 0 and 0.86 with a 0.44 mean and a standard deviation of 0.272. The average 
here is also 44% and compared with the other ownership structures that we examine, 
FAMILY is the dominant one. GOVERNMENT ranges between 0 and 0.82 with a 0.04 
mean and a standard deviation of 0.16.FOREIGN ranges between 0 and 0.799 with a 
0.075 mean and a standard deviation of 0.176. SIZE ranges between 11.79 and 29.1 
with a 491703.8 mean and a standard deviation of 11953132. PROFIT ranges between -
39.71 and 54.35 with a -0.82 mean and a standard deviation of 6.78. LEV ranges be-
tween 0 and 84.32 with a 29.49 mean and a standard deviation of 17.38. CAPINT rang-
es between 0.0006 and 0.932 with a 0.38 mean and a standard deviation of 0.22. 
GROWTH ranges between 0.05 and 13.92 with a 0.83 mean and a standard deviation 
of 1.21. LIQUIDITY ranges between 0.17 and 22.18 with a 1.93 mean and a standard 
deviation of 2.12. AGE ranges between 2.3 and 4.76 with a 3.45 mean and a standard 
deviation of 0.52. 
 Table 8 shows the correlations between variables in the TAXAGG model. 
 
[See Table 8] 
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The correlation is according to Spearman’s correlation coefficient. An examina-
tion of table 8 shows a negative connection between FAMILY and TAXAGG. This indi-
cates that firms with family ownership are more tax aggressive. There is a positive as-
sociation between GOVERNMENT and FOREIGN with TAXAGG. This indicates that firms 
with government ownership and foreign ownership are less tax aggressive. TAXAGG is 
also positive associated with SIZE, LIQUIDITY, PROFIT, GROWTH and CAPINT. There is a 
negative association between TAXAGG and LEV and AGE. It is interesting that there is a 
negative correlation between FAMILY and FOREIGN at -0.55917.  
Table 9 gives us the outcomes from the regression model of tax aggressiveness 
with control variables. 
Table 9. Regression results 
Dependent Variable: TAXAGG   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.554970 1.080718 0.513520 0.6078 
FAMILY -0.189553 0.732955 -0.258616 0.7960 
GOVERNMENT 0.362893 1.042733 0.348021 0.7280 
FOREIGN 1.743208 1.017756 1.712796 0.0873 
SIZE -1.48E-09 1.16E-08 -0.127516 0.8986 
PROFIT 0.018946 0.021875 0.866083 0.3868 
LEV 0.019719 0.008969 2.198596 0.0283 
CAPINT 0.292306 0.682055 0.428567 0.6684 
GROWTH -0.055092 0.119840 -0.459709 0.6459 
LIQUIDITY -0.033125 0.071369 -0.464139 0.6427 
AGE -0.354021 0.271569 -1.303614 0.1929 
D2010 0.068323 0.431814 0.158222 0.8743 
D2011 0.014205 0.430055 0.033032 0.9737 
D2012 -0.237877 0.430411 -0.552675 0.5807 
D2013 0.720174 0.427745 1.683651 0.0928 
     
     R-squared 0.033856    Mean dependent var 0.076840 
Adjusted R-squared 0.010292    S.D. dependent var 3.284903 
S.E. of regression 3.267955    Akaike info criterion 5.231343 
Sum squared resid 6130.052    Schwarz criterion 5.342848 
Log likelihood -1525.631    Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.274786 
F-statistic 1.436750    Durbin-Watson stat 1.944838 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.130910    
     
     
 
As we can notice from the table above variable FAMILY has coefficient -
0.189553 and probability of 0.7960. GOVERNMENT has coefficient 0.362893 and prob-
ability of 0.7280. FOREIGN has coefficient 1.7443208 and probability of 0.0873. With a 
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significant level of 10% the variable FOREIGN would be statistically significant. From 
the control variables, again only LEV has a challenging probability of 0.0283. This 
means that if the significant level was at 25%, the variance LEN would be statistically 
significant. The Durbin Watson statistic is 1.944838 and since it is near 2 this means 
there is no autocorrelation in the sample. R-square is 0.033856, a number very close to 
zero and this means that the dependent variable TAXAGG cannot be predicted from 
the independent variables FAMILY, GOVERNMENT and FOREIGN. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This study has attempted to examine the effect of ownership structure to tax 
avoidance. We specified ownership structure as family ownership, government owner-
ship and foreign ownership and examining Greek listed firms over the years 2010-
2014. Through this study, we tried to investigate the range of tax avoidance, from the 
determinants to the consequences that the phenomenon has. Thus, we created panel 
dataset of 165 and 121 listed firms, comprising 737 and 589 observations. In the re-
search that was conducted above none of the two samples, A and B, gave us statistical-
ly significant results. It is our confidence that the theory is in the right order and it is 
most likely the problem with results may cause from the economic and financial insta-
bility in Greece during the scrutiny period.     
My work adds to the bibliography since, as far as I know, it is one of the few to 
critically examine the connection between ownership structure and tax aggressiveness 
at the public firms, in Greece, during a financial crisis. All other studies examine similar 
issues on different period, where the economy figures were much better. This disserta-
tion contributes to the ongoing debate about tax avoidance and the reason that create 
the phenomenon. The results we produced may not be ideal for conclusions but they 
are original and they can be used in future research. 
For future research, I would recommend to focus only on family and foreign 
ownership. Family companies are the majority of public and private firms in Greece 
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while foreign owned companies gaining the control of the largest firms in Greece. An-
other reason is that government ownership has poor literature and the presence of 
the state in listed firms will reduce even more the next years because of Greece’s debt 
obligations. The new regulations about double taxation, tax heavens and the arrival of 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) in the following years makes the taxation issues 
research challenging. According to OECD, BEPS is a framework that includes 100 coun-
tries and jurisdictions. Their goal is ‘to reduce the implementation of tax avoidance 
strategies that exploit gaps and mismatches in tax rules to artificially shift profits to 
low or no-tax locations’’. In June 2015, OECD released its Action Plan involving 15 dif-
ferent actions. Furthermore, on January 2016, the European Union released the Anti 
Tax Avoidance Package. This Package contained draconian measures to prevent ag-
gressive tax planning, promote tax transparency and create equal terms for all busi-
nesses in the EU. It will be quite interesting for future researchers to see the results of 
these actions in the near future. Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) are strong suggesting a 
continuous investigation on the decisive factors of tax avoidance and Weisbach (2002) 
asks why there is not more legal ways to protect investors from taxes. Hanlon and 
Heitzman (2010) request a greater extend of investigationin the factors that analyses 
the ways taxes are avoided. Labelle et al (2014), wonder if business ethics is the ‘‘Last 
Rampart’’, the last defense against tax avoidance and agree with Lanis and Richardson 
(2012, 2013) that we need to investigate the participation of business ethics in leading 
corporate tax policy. 
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Appendix 
Table 4. Statistic results 
                        
 TAXAGG FAMILY GOVERNMENT FOREIGN SIZE PROFIT LEV CAPINT GROWTH LIQUIDITY AGE 
            
            
 Mean  0.107842  0.439688  0.040749  0.090550  394300.7 -1.918555  32.79893  0.378337  0.901301 -3650.799  3.501936 
 Median  0.130242  0.493500  0.000000  0.000000  18.14917 -1.047000  33.62980  0.366808  0.465900  1.294000  3.465736 
 Maximum  43.05639  0.972700  0.972700  0.966730  2.91E+08  54.35400  84.31820  0.939142  26.74740  645000.0  4.836282 
 Minimum -38.01735  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  11.79030 -67.48300  0.000000  0.000568  0.043300 -2655000.  2.302585 
 Std. Dev.  2.968105  0.277765  0.163224  0.200013  10703883  7.924291  19.65991  0.231026  1.583015  104605.0  0.531062 
 Skewness  1.177552 -0.260406  4.115422  2.531177  27.09246 -0.656493  0.176254  0.353238  8.324154 -22.15871  0.290621 
 Kurtosis  126.1063  1.848525  18.68031  8.701718  735.0014  14.85708  2.470040  2.460212  110.6135  565.8286  2.590975 
            
 Jarque-Bera  465560.4  49.04547  9630.711  1785.291  16544483  4370.235  12.44052  24.27425  364134.3  9787977.  15.51213 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.001989  0.000005  0.000000  0.000000  0.000428 
            
 Sum  79.47951  324.0499  30.03175  66.73561  2.91E+08 -1413.975  24172.81  278.8346  664.2589 -2690639.  2580.927 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  6483.899  56.78481  19.60851  29.44383  8.43E+16  46216.67  284472.8  39.28260  1844.368  8.05E+12  207.5719 
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Table 5. Correlations 
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Covariance Analysis: Spearman rank-order         
            
            Probability TAXAGG  FAMILY  GOVERNMEN  FOREIGN  SIZE  PROFIT  LEV  CAPINT  GROWTH  LIQUIDITY  AGE  
TAXAGG  1.000000           
 -----            
            
FAMILY  -0.093127 1.000000          
 0.0114 -----           
            
GOVERNMENT  0.100826 -0.368618 1.000000         
 0.0062 0.0000 -----          
            
FOREIGN  0.094701 -0.577072 0.061231 1.000000        
 0.0101 0.0000 0.0967 -----         
            
SIZE  0.053292 -0.115627 0.099193 0.049544 1.000000       
 0.1484 0.0017 0.0070 0.1791 -----        
            
PROFIT  0.444156 -0.083092 0.209129 0.089609 0.081901 1.000000      
 0.0000 0.0241 0.0000 0.0150 0.0262 -----       
            
LEV  -0.091181 0.038498 -0.142466 0.120767 0.050725 -0.419538 1.000000     
 0.0133 0.2966 0.0001 0.0010 0.1689 0.0000 -----      
            
CAPINT  -0.045137 0.113793 0.101551 -0.050848 0.114567 -0.113696 0.077391 1.000000    
 0.2210 0.0020 0.0058 0.1679 0.0018 0.0020 0.0357 -----     
            
GROWTH  0.174906 -0.199432 0.155642 0.220943 -0.032416 0.280357 -0.063068 -0.052370 1.000000   
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3795 0.0000 0.0871 0.1555 -----    
            
LIQUIDITY  0.131092 0.014720 0.107063 -0.040375 -0.020745 0.432617 -0.569640 -0.226545 -0.001154 1.000000  
 0.0004 0.6899 0.0036 0.2737 0.5739 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9750 -----   
            
AGE  -0.104465 0.124226 -0.033813 -0.008094 0.034326 -0.081104 0.021647 0.233333 -0.049061 -0.064530 1.000000 
 0.0045 0.0007 0.3593 0.8264 0.3521 0.0277 0.5574 0.0000 0.1834 0.0800 -----  
            
            
            
   
  -4- 
Table 7. Statistic results 
 
 TAXAGG FAMILY GOVERNMENT FOREIGN SIZE PROFIT LEV CAPINT GROWTH LIQUIDITY AGE 
 Mean  0.076840  0.441806  0.042972  0.074705  493373.4 -0.816328  29.54410  0.380155  0.835382  1.926370  3.455667 
 Median  0.167834  0.499140  0.000000  0.000000  18.09399 -0.437000  29.98410  0.375347  0.462000  1.398000  3.433987 
 Maximum  43.05639  0.858800  0.820654  0.799400  2.91E+08  54.35400  82.34250  0.932922  13.91950  22.18200  4.762174 
 Minimum -38.01735  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  11.79030 -39.71400  0.000000  0.000568  0.054400  0.170000  2.302585 
 Std. Dev.  3.284903  0.272859  0.162995  0.176572  11973399  6.795298  17.38268  0.217548  1.207524  2.119375  0.525294 
 Skewness  1.077444 -0.329570  3.868735  2.637295  24.20747  0.644719  0.098868  0.198337  5.387015  5.701116  0.315772 
 Kurtosis  105.2061  1.837360  16.55576  8.930868  587.0017  14.26668  2.418562  2.394634  44.11068  46.82712  2.631728 
            
 Jarque-Bera  256478.2  43.83629  5979.014  1546.039  8427657.  3156.078  9.256359  12.85537  44326.36  50330.73  13.11681 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.009773  0.001616  0.000000  0.000000  0.001418 
            
 Sum  45.25848  260.2236  25.31054  44.00142  2.91E+08 -480.8169  17401.47  223.9112  492.0401  1134.632  2035.388 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  6344.866  43.77777  15.62152  18.33247  8.43E+16  27151.53  177668.6  27.82823  857.3716  2641.149  162.2494 
            
 Observations  589  589  589  589  589  589  589  589  589  589  589 
 
 
 
 
Table 8. Correlations 
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Covariance Analysis: Spearman rank-order         
Balanced sample (listwise missing value deletion)         
            
            Correlation           
Probability TAXAGG  FAMILY  
GOVERNMENT
  FOREIGN  SIZE  PROFIT  LEV  CAPINT  GROWTH  LIQUIDITY  AGE  
TAXAGG  1.000000           
 -----            
            
FAMILY  -0.129666 1.000000          
 0.0016 -----           
            
GOVERNMENT  0.097439 -0.391170 1.000000         
 0.0180 0.0000 -----          
            
FOREIGN  0.152838 -0.561728 0.114713 1.000000        
 0.0002 0.0000 0.0053 -----         
            
SIZE  0.041888 -0.084812 0.105309 -0.007635 1.000000       
 0.3102 0.0396 0.0105 0.8533 -----        
            
PROFIT  0.419904 -0.150471 0.199542 0.169127 0.098444 1.000000      
 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0169 -----       
            
LEV  -0.042768 0.110220 -0.115171 0.056177 0.035726 -0.353703 1.000000     
 0.3001 0.0074 0.0051 0.1733 0.3868 0.0000 -----      
            
CAPINT  0.011261 0.172287 0.115000 -0.170023 0.166312 -0.140859 0.133635 1.000000    
 0.7851 0.0000 0.0052 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.0012 -----     
            
GROWTH  0.209457 -0.271327 0.162307 0.354644 -0.007554 0.389126 -0.060803 -0.117288 1.000000   
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.8548 0.0000 0.1405 0.0044 -----    
            
LIQUIDITY  0.058924 -0.014490 0.083325 -0.004440 0.002642 0.354600 -0.596226 -0.221451 0.006288 1.000000  
 0.1532 0.7256 0.0432 0.9144 0.9490 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.8790 -----   
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AGE  -0.118736 0.101730 -0.019508 -0.063517 0.062282 -0.095972 0.054542 0.238830 -0.059120 -0.105028 1.000000 
 0.0039 0.0135 0.6366 0.1236 0.1311 0.0198 0.1862 0.0000 0.1519 0.0108 -----  
            
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
